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WHO SHALL PAY? 
An Argument for a Universal Right 
to 'counsel for Indigent Defendants .. 
It is not to be thought of, in a civilized 
community, for a moment, that any citizen 
put in jeopardy of life or liberty, should 
be debarred of counsel because he was too 
poor to employ ~huc aid. No court would be 
respected, or respect itself, to sit and 
hear such atrial. 
The defense of the poor, in such cases is a 
duty resting somewhere, which will at once 
be conceded as essential to the accused, to 
the court, and to the public. 
And the only question is, who shall pay? 
--Webb v. Baird, 6 IND 13, 18 (1854) 
The Indiana Supreme Court, in 1854, spoke to the issue 
of appointed counsel for indigent defendants. To these 
early Hoosier justices it was a matter of conscience, a 
matter of public and self-respect, that counsel be provided 
for those unable to afford it. After all, how could a lay-
man, hailed into an unfamiliar adversary proceeding 
adequately defend himself without the knowledge and expert-
ise of counsel? The necessity for such aid was obvious 
to the justices. Their only reservation was a matter of 
fiscal policy_ 
1 
2 
While this realization of fundamental fairness was 
basic to the Hoosier Supreme Court, at least in this instance, 
other courts were not so disposed. It was not until 1932, 
some seventy-eight years later, that the United States 
Supreme Court declared that a right to counsel existed 
under the federal constitution through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 1 Since that time, the Supreme Court has 
slowly, and somewhat less than methodically, extended the 
right to counsel from capital offenses2 to felonies} mis-
demeanors 4 and into some civil areas. 5 
The courts have, however, stopped short of the full 
realization of the promises of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Logic and basic concept of fundamental fairness implie~--
if not requires an extension of the right to appointed 
counsel for indigents into every type of adversary 
judicial proceeding. 
Before venturing into the realm of judicial precedent 
establishing the right to counsel, it is essential to have 
1 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
2 Ibid . 
3 'd ' Gl eon v. Walnwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
4Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
5These areas include paternity suits and actions to 
terminate parental rights. These will be discussed at 
length in section II. 
an understanding of two constitutional concepts upon 
which the right is founded: The concepts of equal prot-
ection and due process. 
3 
-I. THE PROMISES OF A CIVILIZED SOCIETY 
The concepts themselves, while relatively concise, 
have a broad and complex interpretative scope. The 
Fourteenth Amendment states: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the priveleges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; ~ shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, withOUt due process of law; nor aeny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws~ 
While this "Civil War" Amendment was originally 
created for the purpose of protecting former slaves in the 
:"s~th it has since been expanded into almost all aspects 
'of the judicial process. 7 
The oldest of two doctrines, in terms of wide spread 
judicial application is the Due Process Clause. This clause 
is essentially a promise of procedural processes if the 
government acts to deprive a citizen of life, liberty 
or property. Justice Harlan, attempting to define the due 
process promise, said: 
... There can be no doubt that at a minimum ... 
the abstract words of the Due Process Clause •.. 
require that deprivation of life, liberty or 
property by adjudication be preceded by notice 
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 
nature of the case. 8 
6 . Unlted States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment (1868) 
7For a detailed discussion of the application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment see: MEyer. The History and Meaning 
of the Fourteenth Arnendmen~(1977); and, Cortne~The 
SUpreme Court and the Second Bill of Rights, (198~ 
8 
Boddie v. Connecticut,401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) 
4 
In order to erect any substantial barrier of procedural 
due process, the judiciary must be presented with evidence 
in two areas. First, it must be shown that a state is 
acting to deprive a citizen of life, liberty or property, 
and second that the interests involved warrant a certain 
level of procedural protection. 
In the realm of deprivations of life, state executions 
are the most obvious example. In recent years, the Court 
has upheld state-imposed executions providing that 
imposition of the penalty is discretionary and objective 
standards exist to control the discretion of those imposing 
the penalty.9 While a deprivation of life by execution 
is obvious, the Court has also entered into definitional 
gray areas by attempting to determine what process is due 
for protecting life of an unborn fetus. lO 
Governmental actions to deprive persons of property 
take a variety of forms, both direct and indirect. The 
scope of these activities is almost universal, with the 
realization that whenever a government acts to enforce the 
private property claim of one person against another, that 
government has acted to deprive someone of property.ll 
9profitt v. Florida, 428 u.s. 242 (1976) i Jurek v. Texas, 
1~28 U.S. 262 (1976) i Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153 (1976). 
Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
11 "d h "1" 395 377 (1969) Snl ac v. Faml y Flnance Corp., u.s. . 
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Thus, even in the small claims jurisdiction of a court, 
the state is taking action to deprive someone of property 
and those persons must be afforded some standard of due 
process. 
Perhaps the broadest area of protection afforded 
by the Due Process Clause is that of "liberty". This 
concept encompasses three distinct forms involving 
governmental restraints on: 1) Physical freedom, 2) The 
exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, and; 
more generally, 3) other forms of freedom of choice or 
action. 12 
In a general setting, the concept of physical 
liberty prevents the government from physically restraining 
a person without following their procedures. The obvious 
application of this concept is within the realm of criminal 
procedure. 
Physical liberty has been expanded into non-criminal 
settings to require procedural safeguards similar to 
criminal actions in civil commitment hearings13 and 
expansive substantial rights for the juvenile divisions 
of our courts. 14 Further, the construct has been extended 
into school settings where the threat to physical liberty 
through corporate punishment seems quite insubstantial. 15 
12 
Nowak, et.al.Handbook on Constitutional Law, (1978). 
-- -- -- ---
13 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
14 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
15 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
6 
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Liberty, under the Fourteenth Amendment)also encompasses 
the right to engage in certain constitutionally protected 
activities. The area of free speech has long been an area 
of extensive due process protection against state inter-
vention. The Supreme Court has held that under the 
Fourteenth Amendment "a State is not free to adopt what ever 
procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity ... without 
regard to the possible consequences of constitutionally 
protected speech.,,16 Further, the Court has ruled that any 
system restraining free expression bears a "heavy presumption 
against its constitutional validity. ,,17 
The concept of protected liberties also extends into 
areas of personal choice not constitutionally enumerated. 
The broad-ranging nature of these non-constitutionally 
protected liberties was described by Justice Reynolds who 
stated, 
... it denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint, but also the right of the individual 
to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, establish a horne and bring 
up children, to worship God according to the 
dictates of his own conscience, and, generally, 
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit 
of happiness by free men. 18 
l6Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717,731 (1961). 
17 
Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1961). 
l8Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
This passage would tend to suggest that almost any 
conceivable human activity, when infringed upon like the 
government can be extended due process protection. 
A preliminary conclusion that action by the state 
constitutes a deprivation of life, liberty or property 
must be followed by a second determination. The Court 
then determines what process is due for that protected 
right. This second hurdle calls into play a complex and 
many times subjective process of judicial challenging. The 
Court must consider three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action; second, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of such interests through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of the additional or substitute procedural 
safeguard; and finally, the government's interest 
including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the •.. procedural 
requisites would entail. 19 
In effect, the balancing requirements affect the degree 
of process afforded once life, liberty or property are 
threatened. This two-pronged approach is the fundamental 
basis of due process application. 
The Due Process Clause has a close relative in 
substantive doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause. In 
general terms, the Equal Protection Clause is a bar against 
the deprivation of fundamental rights and privileges of 
citizens by discriminatory classifications of law. Justice 
19 Matqews v. Eldridge, 424 u.s. 319, 335 (1976). 
8 
Black said that the Equal Protection Clause requires 
"that all people must stand on an equality before the bar 
of justice in every Arnercian court. ,,20 Of course, the 
application of equal protection is not so simplistic. 
In applying this concept, the Court has developed 
what has been described as a "rigid two-tier attitude.,,2l 
On the first level, where judicial scrutiny is minimal, 
the classification is valid if the standard is not arbitrary; 
if there is a deference in the subject area to legislative 
determinations; and, if the classification is plausibly 
related to legimate state interests. The second level, 
requiring "strict" judicial scrutiny, are governmental 
classifications affecting fundamental constitutional 
guarantees or, classification made along "suspect" lines. 
The latter classification demands that the enactment was 
drawn upon "compelling" state interest in order to be 
sustained. 22 
The Courts' application of the Equal Protection Clause 
under suspect classification is almost always fatal for the 
statutory system. For example, since 1945, no statutory 
9 
scheme based upon the suspect classification of race has been 
sustained by the Court. 23 Other classifications given strict 
20Charnbers v. Florida, 309 u.s. 227 (1939). 
2lpo l yviou. The Equal Protection of the Laws,(1980) p. 179. 
22 b'd I 1 . 
23Nowak, et.al., p. 549. 
judicial scrutiny, but not yet accorded the full status of 
"suspect" clauses are those based upon illegitimacy,24 
alienage 25 and gender. 26 Fundamental rights areas garnering 
"strict" scrutiny have included the rights of franchise 27 
and privacy.28 
From this preliminary review of the due process and 
equal protection doctrines, it becomes apparent that they 
are related by more than just their placement in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Both concepts have virtually the same 
application: they both seek to restrict state action 
against individuals. Noting this similarity, Chief Justice 
Earl Warren wrote: 
The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more 
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 
'due process of the law,' and, therefore, we 
do not imply that the two are always interchange-
able phrases. But as this Court has recognized, 
discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be 
violative of due process. 29 
[f Justice Warrens' analysis is correct, the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses can be differentiated 
by the legislative goal in creating the distinction. The 
Equal Protection Clause, quite simply, protects groups of 
24Levy v. Louisiana, 391 u.s. 68 (1968). 
25Yick wo v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356 (1886). 
26Reed v. Reed, 404 u.s. 71 (1971) and Frontiers v. 
RIChardson 411 u.s. 677 (1973). 
27Kramer 
28skinner 
29 Bolling 
v. Union School District, 395 u.s. 621 (1968). 
v. Oklahoma, 316 u.s. 535 (1942). 
v. Sharpe, 347 u.s. 497,499 (1953). 
10 
people against statutory systems aimed at depriving those 
groups of certain fundamental rights. While the Due Process 
Clause, can be, and often is, applied with the Equal 
Protection Clause, the concept of equal protection provides 
further protection to groups. 
11 
II. THE PROTECTION OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 
A "DUTY RESTING SO~'lEW?ERE" 
The concept of due process was the first of the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to be applied to the 
right of appointed counsel. The first case in which due 
process was applied was Powell v. Alabama in 1932. 30 
Powell was a combined action arising from the treat-
ment of three black defendants accused of raping two white 
girls following a racial altercation on a train. Following 
the indictment of the defendants on March 31, they were 
arrainged and pleaded not guilty. The trial record lacks 
12 
any reference to the defendants wishes regarding appointment 
or employment of counsel. It should be noted, at this 
point, that the defendants were residents of other states 
with no method of communication with their respective 
homes, and they were described by the records as ignorant 
and illiterate. 31 
On the first day of the trial, following a lengthly 
dialogue with the judge, a member of the local bar accepted 
the responsibility of representing the defendants. Prior 
to this time the judge had "appointed all members of the bar" 
for the purpose of arraigning the defendants. 
30 Powell v. Alabama, supra. 
31 b' I ld., at 52. 
13 
After acknowledging these factors the High Court 
went on to overturn the convictions of the defendants on 
the issue of "whether the denial of the assistance of 
counsel contravenes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution."32 
Interestingly, the Court's due process analysis did 
not take a revolutionary, precedent-setting tone. Instead, 
the Court developed its analysis from established principles 
of the common law existing in the colonies prior to rat-
ification of the Fourteenth Amendment. To the Court, the 
concept of a right to counsel was not new. 
Following a lengthy review of English Common law 
and the early state constitutions, the Court concluded 
that in all of the early states, counsel was recognized 
as a matter of right relating to capital and serious 
crimes where the life of the defendant was threatened. 
The justices concluded 
... that the right involved is of such a character 
that it cannot be denied without violating those 
fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions. 33 
The Court further stated that the right to counsel 
was not to be applied to the states because of its 
existance in the federal Constitution, rather, because 
the nature of the necessity of counsel was "included in the 
conception of due process of law."34 
32 bOd 0 I 1 0' at 6 • 
33 bOd 67 I 1 • ,at . 
34 
Ibid.,pp. 67-68. 
The right to counsel was thus equated to the procedural 
requirements of due process, separate and distinct from 
the original Bill of Rights. 
The nature of counsel as a requisite of fair process 
was further enunciated by the Court insistance that, 
the right to be heard would be, in many cases, 
of little avail if it did not comprehend the 
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent 
and educated layman has small and sometimes no 
skill in the science of law. 35 
The Court then declared, that even in the absence of 
statutory authority, the trial court was under the "duty" 
to appoint counsel-and counsel was under a "duty" to accept 
appointment-to preserve the fundamental fairness of the 
proceding. 36 
Despite the comprehensive evaluation of the necessity 
of counsel to insure due process, the Court's final 
holding fell in much narrower terms. The justices con-
cluded that this duty and the preservation of due process 
applied only in capital cases "where the defendant is 
unable to employ counsel, and is incapable of adequately 
making his own defense because of ignorance, feeblemindness 
or illiteracy ... ".37 
35Ibid . pp 68-69. 
36 Ibid ., at 73. 
37 Ibid., at 71. 
14 
The Court, however, should not be criticized for the 
scope of their judgment in Powell. They were simply ad-
hering to the "rule" that constitutional questions must be 
decided-upon the narrowest grounds possible. 38 The justices 
make the decision appropriate for the scope of the facts 
involved in the present case. The majority immediately prior 
to stating their holding considered "other criminal 
prosecutions," but refused to anticipate the future exten-
sion of the doctrine. 39 
The Court first pondered the proposition of extending 
the right to COunsel beyond the scope of Powell nine years 
later in Betts vs. Brady~O In this case, the indigent 
15 
defendant petitioned the Maryland court for appointed counsel 
at his arraignment. The judge denictl his request because 
it was "not the practice in Carroll county to appoint 
counsel for indigent defendants save in prosecutions for 
murder and rape."4l Despite the court's refusal, and with-
out waiving his asserted right to counsel, the defendant 
conducted his own defense. Following his conviction, he ap-
pealed solely on the basis that the trial court had denied his 
38 1 d" h d 297 For a comp ete lSCUSSlon see, Asc wan er v. TVA, 
U.S. 228 (1936). 
39 Powell v. Alabama, supra. at 71. 
40Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 454 (1940). 
4l Ibid ., at 457. 
application for counsel in violation of the provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a 6-3 decision the U. S. 
Supreme Court upheld the defendan't~) conviction. 42 
",,--,' 
Referring to Powell and its companion cases, the 
Justices refused to extend the procedural protections 
of the Due Process Clause absent a showing that the defendant 
was incapable of conducting his own defense (i.e. ,absent a 
showing of ignorance, feeble-mindedness or illiteracy). 
In doing so, the Court reverted to a substantive, rather 
than a procedural test of due process. 
The phrase (due process of the laws) formulates 
a concept less rigid and more fluid than those 
envisaged in other specific and particular 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
Its application is less a matter of rule. 
Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal 
of the totality of facts in a given case. 
That which may, in one setting, constitute a 
denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to 
the universal sense of justice, may in other 
circumstances, and in the light of other 
considerations, fall short of such a denial. 43 
The Betts court reevaluated the long line of common 
law relating to the "fundamental nature" of the right to 
appointed counsel and, despite the majority in Powell, 
held that the intent of the early state constitutions was 
only to bar rules denying counsel to defendants. In 
other words, the state was obligated in all criminal 
prosecutions to "allow" representation by counsel, but 
42 Ibid . 
43 bOd 462 ~., at . 
16 
-the state had no affirmative duty to appoint counsel for 
indigents. 44 
The protections afforded to indigents was thus reduced 
in non-capital cases from the potential status as a 
procedural rule to less certain test of substantive fact. 
As a result, the extension of the procedural protections 
of due process were stunted. The Supreme Court, from 1941 to 
1963 refused to apply due process except as a substantive 
test of fundamental fairness. The assessed need for rep-
17 
resentation was thus subjected to the subjective whims of nine 
men in Washington. This is not to imply that the Court 
ignored the right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but rather interpreted its application on a case by case 
basis. In effect, this interpretation allowed state courts 
to procede in actions that would have been held unconstitutional 
in similar cases on the federal level. 45 
Under the Betts doctr,ine, only the most extreme conduct 
by state courts constituted a constitutional denial of the 
right to counsel. Probably the most clearcut example of the 
subjective nature of the Betts doctrine came before the Court 
in 1946. 46 In a per curiam decision, the justices overturned 
the Michigan conviction of Rene De Meerleer on the charge 
of murder. 
44 Ibid ., at 466. 
45B tIl' . ~ v. I lnols, 333 U.S. 640, 649 (1947). 
46De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1946). 
-To the justices, the facts of De Meerleer spoke for 
themselves. 
On May 16, 1932, an information was filed in 
the Circut Court of Lenawee County, Michigan, 
charging the petitioneer, then seventeen years 
of age ... with the crime of murder. On the 
same day, petitioneer was arraigned, tried, 
convicted of first-de~7ee murder and sentenced 
to life imprisonment. 
During the entirety of this one day procedure, the 
defendant was not advised of his right to counsel nor 
was he provided with counsel. No evidence was introduced 
on his behalf and De Meerleer did not cross-question any of 
the states' witnesses. 
On the basis of these facts, in a two-page per curiam, 
18 
the Court found that De Meerleer was "deprived of rights 
essential to a fair hearing under the federal Constitution."48 
Other convictions for non-capital crimes, absent a showing of 
49 
such extreme circumstance, were upheld by the Court. 
During this early era of constitutional adjudication, 
two elements in the application of the right to counsel 
became clear. First, the justices seemed only willing 
to apply the p~otections of due process when the state was 
acting to deprive a citizen of life. Only in the trial of 
capital crimes for which the penalty could be death, 
47 Ibid ., at 664. 
48 Ibid ., at 665. 
49Gibbs v. Burkes, 337 u.s. 773 (1948); and, Bute v. 
Ill1nois, supra. 
was the appointment of counsel required. Second, the 
relative value of representation by counsel as a fundamental 
element of four judicial proceedings, was at a low ebb. 
The justices, by implication, are effectively denying 
the value of counsel except in life-threatening situations. 
It must be noted, however, that the view of the Court 
during this era was not unanimous. The dissenters, lead 
by Justice Douglas and Black sharply criticized the 
position of the majority, calling for the nullification 
of the Betts decision. 50 
It was not until 1963 in Gideon v. wainwright5l 
that the dissenter's request for a reconsideration of 
Betts was granted. As in Betts, the petitioneers only 
l ('.' 
~ 
grounds for appeal was that the failure of the trial 
court to appoint counsel for his defense, constituted 
a denial of due process. 
In less than six pages, the majority, led by Justice 
Black, struck down the Betts doctrine. The substantive 
test, requiring an evaluation of the "totality of the 
facts" was obliterated and replaced with a solid proced-
ural rule. Noting that the Court had erred in the creation 
50 Betts v. Brady supra., Gibbs v. Burkes, supra., and 
Bute v. Illinois, supra. 
51G'd " h 1 eon v. Wa1nwr1g t, supra. 
19 
of the Betts doctrine, Justice Black concluded that, 
a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 
, fundamental and essential to a fair trial' 
is made obligatory upon the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 52 
Thus, by incorporating the promises of the Sixth 
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, and thereby 
applying the Sixth Amendment to the states, the Supreme 
Court established the fundamental and essential nature 
of the right to appointed counsel. 
The Court also recognized another principle in 
Gideon fundamental to the guarantee of due process. 
In a concurring opinion by Justice Clark, the Court 
effectively eroded the paper distinction between the 
level of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to capital and non-capital offenses. Taking special 
note of the distinction established by the Betts decision, 
Clark asked: 
How can the Fourteenth Amendment tolerate a 
procedure which it condemns in capital cases 
on the ground that deprival of liberty may be 
less onerous than a deprival of life - a value 
judgment not universally accepted - or that only 
the latter deprival is irrevocable?53 
52 b'd 342 ~., at . 
53Ibid ., at 349 . 
20 
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This realization of the concept of physical liberty 
and its central nature to cases involving the right to 
appointed counsel had not been previously enunciated by the 
Supreme Court. Gideon in this respect, reflects an extension 
of the protective nature of procedural due process. The 
Court has thus acknowledged a conceptual expansion of due 
process into the realms of physical liberty. 
This expansion was the central issue for the Court 
in 1972 in Argersinger v. Hamlin. 54 Here the petitioneer 
questioned the lower courts inter~retation of Gideon, being 
that appointment of counsel was required only in felony 
prosecutions. The Court, again extending the procedural 
protections to be afforded for physical liberty, struck 
down the distinction between felony and misdemeanor 
classifications. The Court ruled that no person could be 
imprisoned, even for violation of a municipal ordinance, 
. f h d' d h . h f ' 55 . 1 1 e was en1e t e r1g t 0 counse~. Just1ce Doug as 
noted that regardless of the severity of the sentence, 
"the accused will receive 'the guiding hand of counsel' 
so necessary when one's liberty is in jeopardy.,,56 
54 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra. 
55 Ibid ., at 40. 
56 I bid. 
It is important to note at this point that Argersinger 
is distinct on previous ruling in another aspect. 
Argersinger represents a more mature application and 
testing of due process. While it is true that the Court 
recognized the fundamental interest of personal liberty 
it is not without some of judicial balancing that the 
Court extended due process protection to that interest. 
Once the Court had concluded that great private 
interests were involved (i.e., a deprivation of physical 
liberty), the justices went on to consider that private 
interest in comparison to two other factors. First, 
whether additional procedures would reduce the risk of 
erroneous deprivation; and, second, what impact these 
measures would have on governmental interests. The court 
was quick to conclude that the appointment of counsel 
would decrease erroneous convictions. 57 
The justices also sought to justify their decisions 
on more of a practical ground. They considered a societal 
question being that of the decision's possible impact on 
the legal profession, i.e. overburdening the entire 
22 
profession. Again the Court relied on statistics forecasting 
a measureable increase in bar membership adequate to meet 
the new demand. 58 
57 
Ibid., at 57. 
58 Ibid ., at 37, note 7. 
23 
These actions can be classified as a process of 
judicial balancing. As described in earlier analysis, 
the Court, in extending due process protection, tends to 
weigh the prospective protection against non-constitutional 
standards. Thus, while a fundamental interest maybe defined, 
due process protection is not always extended to cover that 
interest because of competing public interests. This function 
of judicial balancing will become even more apparent when 
considering extension of the right to appointed counsel in 
civil areas. 
Having established the fundamental nature of the right 
to counsel in fair procedures~ the justices opened another 
area of constitutional litigation on equal protection grounds. 
The first hint of the equal protection rationale carne in 
Justiee Black's 1942 dissent in Betts. 59 Commenting on 
the criminal process, he stated that 
a practice cannot be reconsidered with 'common 
and fundamental ideas of fairness and right,~ 
which subjects innocent men to increased dangers 
of conviction merely because of their poverty.60 
Calling for a more liberal rule, for the appointment of 
counsel Black, concluded: "Any other practice seems to me 
to defeat the promise of our democratic society to provide 
59Betts v. Brady, supra, at 474. 
60 Ibid., at 476. 
-equal justice under the law."6l 
While the seed of this constitutional doctrine was 
sown in Betts, it did not begin to grow until 1956 in 
Griffin v. Illinois. 62 The question was not whether the 
state was required to appoint counsel, but rather whether 
the state must provide a free transcript to an indigent 
who wished to appeal his conviction. The state agreed that 
because there were no constitutional requirements for appeals, 
the state had no obligation to remove economic barriers be-
yond the trial level. The Court, led by Justice Black, re-
jected the stiate~ contention relying heavily upon statis-
tics showing that convictions on appeal are often over-
turned. 63 The justices concluded that, 
to deny adequate review to the poor means 
that many of them may lose their life, li-
berty or property because of unjust convictions 
which appellate courts would set aside. 64 
The entire basis of the decision in Griffin rests upon one 
phrase, "there can be no equal justice where the kind of 
65 trial a man gets depends upon the amount of money he has." 
61 Ibid . 
62Griffin v. Illinois, 351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
63 Ibid ., at 18, note 14. 
64 Ibid ., at 18. 
65 Ibid . 
24 
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A further development of the equal protection rationale 
came in Burns v. Ohio. 66 The situation was identical to that 
of Griffin except that Burns' appeal was discretionary, where 
Griffin's appeal was a matter of right. The state argued that 
this fact distinguished Burns from Griffin with the latter 
having no application to the former. The Court soundly re-
jected this claim arguing that under in the state's inter-
pretation, indigents are denied the opportunity to seek the 
discretionary review of the Ohio Supreme Court. Thus, effect-
ively granting those who can afford the transcript fee a 
right over and above the rights of indigents. 67 Chief Justice 
Earl Warren added that, "there is no rational basis for 
assuming that indigents' motions for leave to appeal will be 
less meritorious than those of other defendents."68 
The application of the Equal Protection Clause for in-
digents on appeal was furthered in Douglas v. california. 69 
In Douglas, a single public defender was appointed at the 
trial level to represent two indigents on felony charges. 
The defendants petitioned the court for separate counsel 
and a continuance. These requests were denied. The two were 
convicted, and on appeal of right, requested the appointment 
66 Oh" Burns v. ~, 360 u.s. 252 (1959). 
67 bOd 2 7 ~., at 5. 
68 Ibid ., at 257-258. 
69 Douglas v. California, 372 u.s. 353 (1963). 
of counsel. The appellate court denied this request under 
a California procedural rule authorizing such a denial 
if the appellate court determines there is no merit in 
the appointment of counsel. 70 
In a majority opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court 
overruled the California appeals court. In language strongly 
reminiscent of Griffin, Douglas concluded: 
There is lacking that equality demanded by 
the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, 
who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of 
counsel's examination into the record, research 
of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his 
behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by 
a preliminary determination that the case is 
without merit, is forced to sift for himself. 7l 
Thus, by the nature of the equal protection doctrine, 
states cannot erect procedural rules that would create 
distinctions of right between indigent and non-indigent 
groups. This has been demonstrated in the cases just reviewed: 
in Griffin an indigent appealing of right must be provided 
a transcript; in Burns an indigent seeking a discretionary 
appeal must also be provided a transcript; and, in Douglas 
an indigent must be appointed counsel on appeals of right. 
This pattern implies that court-appointed counsel on 
discretionary appeals would be required to satisfy equal 
protection. 
This pattern was broken by the Supreme Court in 
Ross v. Moffit?2 In Ross, a 6-3 majority denied the right 
70 
Ibid., at 354-355. 
71 
Ibid., at 357-358. 
72 Ross v. Moffit, 417 u.s. 600 (1974). 
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of appointed counsel for indigents on a discretionary 
appeal. Justice Rehnquist speaking for the majority, 
after reviewing the rationale in Douglas and Burns, 
concluded: 
there are obviously limits beyond which the 
equal protection analysis may not be pressed 
without doing violence to principles recognized 
in other decisions of the Court. 73 
Rehnquist noted "other decisions" and concluded that the 
Fourteenth Amendment "does not require absolute equality 
or precisely equal advantages. "74 
In subsequent analysis, Rehnquist reasoned that the 
equal protection doctrine "is not one of absolutes, but 
one of degrees. "75 This analysis of degree which terminates 
the right of counsel on discretionary appeal, is of great 
importance. At this mystical demarcation, as noted by one 
author, the relationship between the state and the indigent 
h d ' h' 76 defendant c anges. The state, accor lng to Re nqulst, 
changes from a duty of providing "equal opportunity" to 
a duty of providing an "adequate opportunity to present 
his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate 
process. "77 
73 b'd I 1 ., at 612 
74 I bid. 
75 Ibid . 
76 Ibid., at 612-613. 
7750 IND. LAW R. 161 (1974). 
27 
For all practical purposes the equal protection 
doctrine acts to prevent states from breaking economic 
barriers to prevent indigents from vindicating constitution-
ally defined rights. The extent of the right to appointed 
counsel on appeal, however, is not clear. Moffit indicates 
that discretionary appeals do not require the appointment 
28 
of counsel under the equal protection doctrine. Unfortunately, 
Rehnquist's opinion lacks any concrete standards by which 
to judge the state's newly defined duty to indigents. This 
opinion seems to be askew of the Court's typical equal 
protection analysis. 
Having solidly established the rights to counsel on due 
process and equal protection grounds in criminal procedings, 
questions began to arise as to counsel requirements to 
insure fair civil actions. A great paradox seemed to be 
building within a constitutional framework. Simply stated, 
if a citizen's liberty was put into such great jeopardy 
in criminal misdemeanor cases, could not a potentially 
greater deprivation of liberty result if counsel were not 
appointed in civil areas? Does a criminal charge, by its 
nature, create a greater threat to one's liberty than a 
civil charge? 
These questions of personal liberty have been debated 
rather cautiously in state appeals court throughout the 
nation. These constitutional discussions have centered in 
three general topic areas including: paternity suits, 
dissolutions and proceeding to terminate parental status. 
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The results of these debates are varied with some jurisdictions 
extending a right of appointed counsel and others denying it. 
Termination of parental rights has gained a great deal 
of attention in courts on the state level. As of 1977, nine 
states78 had concluded that indigent parents have a 
constitutional right to counsel when the state threatens 
their parental status at the trial 1eve1. 79 
Constitutional analysis at the state level seems to 
reflect the same belief that the parent-child relationship 
is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's definition 
of 1iberty.80 The New York court noting that "substantial 
rights" were involved declared; 
A parent's concern for the liberty of the child, 
as well as his care and control, involves too 
fundamental an interest in right to be relinquished 
to the state without the opportunity for a hearing, 
with assigned counsel if the parent lacks the means 
to retain a lawyer. To deny legal assistance under 
such circumstances wou1d •.. constitute a violation 
of his due process rights and .. ~i denial of equal 
protection of the laws as well. 
78Ca1ifornia, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Washington and West Virginia. 
79 80 ALR3d 1141,1148. 
80pennys1vania, In Re the Adoption of ! 312 A2d 601 (1973); 
Washington, In Re Welfare of Luscier 524 P2d 906 (1974) I 
West Virginia; State ex. reI. Lemaster v. Oakley 203 SE2d 
140 (1974); New York, Re B. 285 NE2d 288 (1972). 
81Re B. Supra., at 290. 
The Washington court, like many of its sister 
jurisdictions, noted that the requirement of appointed 
counsel may improve the fairness and accuracy of the 
proceeding. This stride is accomplished by creating 
a better balance of legal knowledge and expertise between 
the state and the indigent parents. 82 
By taking this action, the state jurisdictions have 
effectively eroded the distinctions between "civil" and 
"criminal" proceedings in regard to procedural requisites. 
The focus is no longer upon the classification of the 
hearing, but rather the nature of the private interests 
involved. As one jurisdiction concluded, 
whether the proceeding be labeled civil or 
criminal, it is fundamentally unfair, and a 
denial of due process of law for the state 
to seek removal of the child from an indigent 
parent without according that parent the right 
to be assistance of court-appointed ... counsel. 83 
Not only is there division within the states as to 
the right to counsel in parental right terminations, there 
is also sharp division between justices of the United States 
Supreme Court on the same issues. The Court considered 
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the issue in 1981 in Lassiter v. Department of Social services. 84 
82 In Re Welfare of Luscier, Supra. 
83Re the Adoption of I. Supra., at 603. 
84Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
The result was a 5-4 decision with the majority concluding 
that no inherent procedural right of counsel existed under 
the Fourteenth Amendment for indigent parents in parental 
right terminations. 
Following a three part analysis, the majority concluded 
that while no universal procedural right to counsel existed, 
a "case by case" approach could be utilized to test the 
"fundamental fairness" of each individual proceeding. 85 The 
dissenters, following the same three-part analysis but coming 
to an opposite result, sharply criticize the court for 
adopting an "ad hoc approach" that had been "thoroughly 
discredited" twenty years before in Gideon v. wainwright?6 
The dissenters' analysis of the need for uniform 
procedural right to counsel in parental right terminations, 
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had three distinct elements identical to the rationale of the 
majority. First, the parent-child relationship was 
acknowledged as a unique and guarded right fundamental to the 
protected concept of liberty. Second, the complexity and 
adversary nature of such proceedings presented a danger of 
erroneous holdings if the parent was not equipped with a 
skilled attorney. Third, the state has a vested interest with 
85Ibid ., at 33. 
86 Ibid., at 35. 
the parents, for an accurate determination as well as 
an opposing monetary interest in terms of providing 
counsel and lengthening procedures. 87 
In defending their argument for the extension of 
the procedural right to appointed counsel in this area, 
the dissenters argued that such procedural norms are 
established to insure that justice is done in every case 
and to prevent "unpredictable and unchecked adverse 
governmental action ll against the fundamental interests of 
indigent defendants. 88 The dissenters added that the 
majority's holding effectively undermines the concept of 
"general fairness" and "society's commitment to the rule 
of law.,,89 
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, argued that 
the Court's action deprived indigent defendants of liberty, 
by disrupting natural parent-child relationships, and 
property, by destroying statutory rights of inherents. 90 
Stevens also sharply criticized the rationale employed by 
the majority focusing on the monetary interests of the 
state, concluding that: 
87 Ibid., pp. 35-60. 
88 Ibid ., at 50. 
89 Ibid . 
90 Ibid ., at 60. 
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the issue is one of fundamental fairness, not 
of weighing the pecuniary costs against societal 
benefits ..•• For the value of protecting our 
liberty from deprivation by the State without 
due process of law is price1ess. 91 
While the other named issues of paternity and 
dissolutions have not been confronted by the Supreme 
Court, the rationale imposed by the lower courts has been 
nearly identical to the reasoning of the Court in Lassiter. 
Although the Supreme Court has never directly con-
fronted the issue of the rights to counsel in paternity 
and dissolutions, there has been a considerable amount 
of debate on the state level. In most instances, state 
jurisdiction have used the same analytical structure as 
33 
the United States Supreme Court did in the Lassiter decision. 
Under the subject area of paternity, only four states 
have declared that indigent defendants have a constitutional 
right to counsel. 92 Two other jurisdictions have declared 
that the right exists on other grounds. 93 
The most exemplary of the state decisions establishing 
the constitutional right to counsel in paternity suits was 
91 Ibid ., at 60. 
92A1aska, Reynolds v. Kimmons 569 P2d 799 (1977); California, 
Salas v. Cortez 593 P2d 266 and Los Angeles v. Estes 158 
Cal. Rptr. 123 (1979); Michigan,-xrtibee v. Cheyboygan 
Circuit Judge 243 NW2d 248 (1976), Peoele v. Marshall 
266 NW2d 678 (1978), and Pruitt v. Prultt 282 NW2d 785 (1979). 
93New York, B. v. D. 418 NYS2d 271 (1979) on statutory 
grounds; MInnesota, Hepfe1 v. Bradshaw 279 NW2d 342 (1979) 
on grounds of reliable adjudication. 
the California case of Salas v. Cortez. In this decision, 
the Court developed its analysis of potential deprivations 
of basic rights in two areas. 
First, the defendant's constitutionally-protected 
"liberty" was greatly endangered. Noting that the interest 
involved in the determination of a parent-child relation-
ship was a "compelling one, ranked among the most basic 
of civil rights," the Court declared that a paternity 
determination could have life time ramifications: 
It may disrupt an established family and damage 
reputations .... It entails an obligation to 
support and educate a child •.• an obligation 94 
that does not end with the child's majority. 
Further, the paternity determination has the potential 
to deprive a defendant of physical liberty since "failure 
to support a child may also be prosecuted criminal. ,,95 
The Court also notes, in a summary fashion, that the 
most obvious interest threatened is that of property due 
to the immediate assessmentof support payments. 96 
The California court also noted that the complexity 
of a state initiated paternity action weighs heavily 
against an unrepresented defendant. The court, in reaching 
this conclusion, examined two paternity proceedings 
against indigent men. In these cases, 
94 Salas v. Cortez, supra., at 230. 
95 Ibid . 
96 Ibid . 
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Each appellant made a diligent effort to 
obtain counsel. Both were ignorant of the 
intricacies of civil practice and one appellant 
was not even fluent in the English language. 
Without the assistance of counsel, neither was 
in a position to respond adequately to the 
district attorney's discovery requests nor to 
initiate discovery himself. Without the assist-
ance of counsel, neither was able to procure the 
assistance of experts to perform blood group tests 
which might conclusively have exonerated him. 
Each was found to be the father of a child on the 
basis of (1) alleged facts which were deemed 
admitted because not contradicted, and (2) 
testimony of the mother which was not subjected 
to cross-examination. In short, without the 
assistance of counsel, neither appellant was 
able to defend against the allegations of the 
complaint. As a result, each was named the 
father of a child by involuntary default. 97 
This scenerio is typical of the majority of paternity 
proceedings instituted against indigent defendants. This 
imbalance, resulting from state interventation can 
commonly raise conviction rates in paternity suits to 95%.98 
In the same study of 1000 paternity cases, blood tests taken 
after an affirmative determination of parentage, revealed 
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that 39.6% of the men accused could not have been the fathers 
of the children. 99 Thus, state courts have determined that 
appointed counsel would have a great impact in increasing the 
accuracy of paternity determination. 
These two factors: the basic interests involved; and, 
the likely result of increased accuracy in paternity deter-
minations, have been' the primary justification for states 
97 Ibid., at 232. 
98--
Helpfel v. Bradshaw, supra., at 346. 
99 b'd I ]. . 
III. PROPERTY IN THE BALANCE: 
IS THE DEFENSE OF THE POOR LESS ESSENTIAL? 
It is one of the ironies of our legal 
system that if the state seeks to 
incarcerate a person for even a single 
day on the least consequential of charges, 
the Constitution requires that counsel 
be provided; but if the state seeks to 
fire a person from a job, or confiscate 
all his ~o~perty there is no right to 
counsel. 
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The Supreme Court, although refusing to appoint counsel, 
has established certain procedural protections when property 
interests are threatened. Regardless of the significance 
of the property in dollar terms, an individual has a 
constitutional right to a hearing before the state can seize 
107 the property. 
The requirements of the constitutionally-required 
hearings, however, are relatively undefined. The Court's 
language states the hearing requirements are as follows: 
The formality and procedural requisites 
for the hearing may vary, depending upon 
the importance of the interests involved 
and the nature of subsequent proceedings; 
. the nature of the hearing will depend 
on appropri6ge accomodation of the competing 
interests; and, 
106Hariman, Due Process of Law (1978), p. 239. 
107 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 u.S. 561 (1972); 
108 
Fuentez v. Shelvin, 407 u.S. 67 (1972); Goss v. Lopez, 
419 u.s. 565 (1975); and, Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 u.S. 319 
(1976) . 
Board of Regents v. Roth, supra., at 570. 
109Fuentez v. Shelvin, supra., at 80. 
The fundamental requirement of due process 
is the opportunity to be heard 'at a mea£Io 
ingful time and in a meaningful manner.' 
Despite these elusive standards, the Court has concluded 
that overall, the hearing must provide a "real test" to 
111 
avoid "unfair and mistaken deprivations of property." 
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One important question remains: what do these standards 
require, in procedural terms, to protect the property rights 
of any individual in any given situation? The very nature 
of the Court's due process interpretations makes this 
practical question rhetorical at best. As the Court has 
repeatedly stated, "due process is flexible and calls for 
h d 1 . th" d d" 112 suc proce ura protect1ons as e s1tuat10n eman s. 
Thus, the procedural due process requirements are ad hoc 
in nature; each judge must, on a case-by-case basis, deter-
mine what process is due. This ad hoc system necessarily 
subjects constitutionally-guaranteed property rights to 
sUbjective evaluation at the trial level. 
To guide the judge in the lower levels of the judiciary, 
the Court has established additional subjective standards. 
The level or process to be afforded in any given situation 
is to be determined by three factors: 
110Mathews v. Eld . t 333 r1ge, supra., a . 
111 Fuentez v. Shelvin, supra., at 97. 
l12Mathews 
Brewer, 
v. Eldrige, supra., at 334, quoting Morrisey v. 
408 u.s. 471, at 481 (1972). 
1) the private interest that will be 
affected by the offical action; 
2) the risk of any erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional substitute procedural 
safeguards; and, 
3) the government's interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that additional 
or substitutel~30cedural requirements 
would entail. 
This process of judicial balancing, as has been evidenced 
in previous analysis, is inherent to almost all right to 
counsel cases. Interestingly, it is the same type of 
procedural test that fell to heavy criticism in Gideon v. 
Wainwright in 1963. 114 
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Even though this balancing process has been described 
115 
as devoid of a systematic pursuit of due process values, 
a brief review of these standards can be used to justify 
the imposition of strict procedural standards standards 
including the right of appointed counsel. 
A. THE PRIVATE INTEREST 
Despite the low ranking of property interests among 
the areas protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the language 
113Mathews v. Eldrige, supra., at 335; quoting Goldberg v. 
Kelley, 379 u.S. 254, at 263-271 (1970) See also 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, supra. 
114see references to Gideon v. Wainwright in previous 
analysis, Section II. 
115 Nowak, et aI, at 503. 
of the Court implies a high level of respect for property 
institutions. The Court has repeatedly stated that: 
• the prohibition against the 
deprivation of property without due 
process of law reflects the high value, 
embedded in our constitutional and 
political history, that we place on a 
person's right to enjoy wha!l~s his, free 
of government interference. 
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Similarly, the Court has developed strong language with 
regard to the ability of individuals to gather property and 
acquire possessions. As Justice Hughes stated in 1915, 
the right to work for a living in the 
common occupations of the community is 
of the very essence of the personal free-
dom and opportunity ~f7the (Fourteenth) 
Amendment to secure. 
By implication, this language reflects the strong dedication 
of our forefathers, which was vested in the Declaration of 
Independence. Surely few would deny that the "pursuit of 
happiness," which captured such a prominent position in 
our nation's history, includes those fundamental property 
rights. 
The private interest reaches an even greater signifi-
cance when one considers the indigent. The indigents have 
l16Fuentez v. Shelvin, supra., at 81; See also, Mathews v. 
Eldrige, supra.; Board of Regents v. Roth, supra.; 
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 u.S. 538 (1972); 
and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra. 
l17Truax v. Raich, 239 u.S. 33, 41 (1915); A similar theme 
was reflected in Meyer v. Nebraska, supra., and 
Board of Regents v. Roth, supra., (J. Marshall dissenting). 
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already suffered from the inadequacies of our economic 
system; the poor are at best on the bottom rung. By virtue 
of their economic status relative to the remainder of 
society, their interest in preserving what little property 
they have is even greater. 
For example, consider the litigation within a small 
claims court. Imagine two defendants hailed into the same 
court on the same day. The monetary claim against both 
amounts to $500.00. Defendant #1, an indigent, earns a 
meager $3,000.00 per year. Defendant #2, however, earns 
$30,000.00 per year. If a judgment is entered against each 
for the full amount of the complaint, the interest of the 
defendants is hardly equal. 
The vested property interest of defendant #2 represents 
only one-sixtieth of his total annual income. Tbe judgment 
against defendant #1, represents one-sixth of his yearly 
subsistence, and could push him even deeper into poverty. 
By reason of this example, it becomes apparent the property 
interests, and subsequent deprivations by the state, are 
relative to the individual's economic status. 
Property, by the language of the Court, is a special 
institution in our political scheme. Property to the 
indigent defendant represents the same constitutional 
priority with an additional intensity created by his relative 
economic position. 
B. THE RISK OF ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION 
The nature and scope of property-oriented litigation 
is too massive to consider in every possible application. 
For the purpose at hand, the analysis in this section will 
be limited to the small claims jurisdiction of our courts. 
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This area is perhaps the most beneficial to examine, since 
it is exemplary of the inherent deficiencies created by 
subjective applications of the due process doctrine. 
In recent years, small claims courts have strained 
under burgeoning case loads. The majority of this load 
has been piled upon the overburdened court systems by 
large businesses. Studies show that nearly 90 percent of 
all cases in small claims jurisdiction are filed by 
collection agencies, finance companies and utilities against 
, d' 'd 1 118 1n 1V1 ua s. 
This fact alone creates an inherent imbalance in any 
subsequent action. The business has massed its forces, 
hired attorneys and proceeded into a state-sanctioned 
institution to collect a debt. The indigent who lacks the 
familiarity and knowledge of the adversary system, is left 
alone to sift for himself. This inadequacy is accentuated 
by the realization that the state accepts this disparity in 
resources; and passes judgment upon the case. It is true 
that the state does not create this imbalance. The state 
does, however, have a constitutional obligation to prevent 
erroneous deprivations of property. If the state affords 
only a hearing, without the benefit of counsel to equalize 
l18Downie, Justice Denied, (1976), p. 82. 
-the imbalance in resources, how can the state fulfill its 
obligations? 
Further exacerbating the situation, is the conclusion 
of a study on garnishments by the House Subcommittee on 
Consumer Affairs. The committee chairman concluded: 
what we know from our study of this 
problem is that in a vast number of these 
cases the debt is a fraudulent one, 
saddled on a poor ignorant person who is 
trapped in an easy credit nightmare, in 
which he is charged double for something 
he could not pay for even if the proper 
price was called for, and then houn~I~ into 
giving up his pound of flesh • • • 
The simplicity of requirement of a hearing prior to 
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property deprivations sharply increases the need for appointed 
counsel. In real terms, a creditor in open court need only 
prove the existence of the debt. The defendant's defenses, 
in this situation are limited to proving payment. This 
leaves open the questions, among others, of product 
function, the legitimacy of the debt, and whether or not 
the vendor has complied with the terms of his sales contract. 
At present, most jurisdictions do not have the time or the 
disposition to reap this information and prepare it for 
1 1 d · t' 120 ega l.ges l.on. 
Without receiving the valuable and exceedingly pertinent 
information, in a form that can be readily consumed by the 
court, the adversary system fails to fulfill its potential. 
119 114 Congo Rec. 1832 
l20Downie, pp. 80-84. 
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This problem was put into concise and direct form by 
Federal Judge Jack Weinstien, who said, "I cannot do my 
job in our adversary system unless parties are adequately 
represented by counse1." Without this measure in civil 
121 
matters, he concluded, the "courts won't work properly." 
Under the present lopsided system, the defendant 
most often loses in small claims court. This fact is 
changed by only one factor: representation by counsel. 
As one author observed, when defendants come to small claims 
courts with attorneys, "claims against them in the majority 
of cases are cut in half or dismissed outright.,,122 
C. THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The third and final weight to consider is the govern-
ment or public interest involved in the litigation of 
property interests. The government has one overriding 
interest that would justify the appointment of counsel in 
property cases: social control. 
The social control rationale is a simple one. If the 
poor are allowed meaningful access to the courts, the 
judicial system will be viewed by the poor as a legitimate 
means to redress grievances. By establishing this level 
of participation, the impoverished are given the benefits 
of - and faith in - the system of governance. Thus, the 
threat of violent revolution as a means of redress is 
l2lH . arl.man, 
122 . Downl.e, 
p. 239. 
p. 83. 
replaced by a controlled, societal mechanism, the courts. 
This theory is deeply rooted in the tradition of the 
provision of legal services to the poor. Early in the 
20th Century, newly-developed legal aid societies used the 
social control theory as its primary justification. 
Theodore Roosevelt, then Police Commissioner of New York, 
was a major proponent of the New York Legal Aid Society. 
In a 1901 speech to the society, he described an actual 
case in which he had observed in the Society's office: 
A glazier carne in and related that he 
had set twenty-two panes of glass in a 
barn and that the owner of the barn had 
refused to pay him $6.60, the agreed 
price. He had been out of work and needed 
this money to buy bread and milk for his 
family's supper. On his way horne from 
the West Side, where had had worked, to 
the East Side, where he lived, he crossed 
Fifth Avenue at Forty-fourth Street and 
passed the luxurious restaurants on either 
corner. His own children went to bed 
supperless. 
The next morning he sought out a lawyer, 
who told him that to bring suit the costs 
and the fee would be ten dollars. This he 
could not pay. From there he went to the 
Municipal Court, originally known as "The 
Poor Man's Court," where he saw a judge, 
who was obliged to explain that he had 
neither the time, nor the money, nor the 
right to undertake the necessary proceedings; 
that as the man had no money, he could not 
prosecute the case; and that, inasmuch as 
the expenses would exceed the amount in 
dispute, he had better drop it. As the man 
told his story, sitting in the office of 
the le~al t~~ society, he was an incipient 
anarch1st. 
123 . h . d Sm1t , Just1ce an the Poor (1971), pp. 10-11 
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Many members of the early legal aid movement spoke of 
" 1 f "t" "124 h 1t f th "social and commerc~a r~c ~on t at resu s rom e 
denial of justice for the poor. By far the most ominous, 
and perhaps the most comprehensive view of the highly-violated 
situation came from Lyman Abbott. Speaking with Roosevelt 
at the 1901 meeting, Lyman concluded: 
If ever a time shall come when in this 
city only the rich man can enjoy law as 
a doubtful luxury, when the poor who need 
it most cannot have it, when only a golden 
key will unlock the door to the courtroom, 
the seeds of revolution will be sown, the 
firebrand of revolution will be lighted 
and put into the hands of men, and they 
will almost be jus!~~ied in the revolution 
which will follow. 
While it is true that these statements were made 
relatively early in judicial consideration of the right to 
appointed counsel, these are not idle, antiquated words. 
Similar concerns were aired in the socially-turbulent 60's. 
Jean Cann, at the 1965 National Conference on Law and 
Poverty, said: 
In community after community, I have 
seen among the indigent a mounting 
frustration, a mounting sense of in-
dignity, the mounting expectations. 
And despite the attempts of the en-
trenched to keep control, the poor will 
increasingly demand their due . . . The 
time is upon us then . . . all the 
poor • • . will one way or another throw 
off the yoke of enslavement in the daily 
details of their lives and demand the 
right to participate as equals in the 
124Ibid ., at 10. 
125Ibid ., at 12. 
-political, econo~~~ and social benefits 
of this country. 
The social unrest of this decade eventually involved 
political actors. Sergeant Shriver, in less than a year, 
became very involved in the concept of IIpublic partici-
pation. 1I127 The concern of political figures for the 
plight of the poor manifested itself in a comprehensive 
program, The Office of Economic Opportunity. This parent 
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program developed a system for providing legal representa-
tion to the poor. This program eventually became the 
Legal Services Organization (L. S. 0.) .128 
Again, the focus of this program was to enhance 
public participation. The first director of the Legal 
Services Program, Clinton Bamberger, was less than enthusi-
astic about the new concern for public participation. At 
an organizational meeting on IImaximum feasible participa-
tionll, Bamberger opened the meeting saying he was IIwilling 
to have the idea discarded. 1I129 He emerged from that 
meeting with a strong conviction as to the necessity of 
legal counsel for the poor. Two months later, at a symposium 
at Notre Dame Law School, Bamberger spoke on citizen partici-
pation: 
126 Larsen, "Seven Years With Legal Aid," 11 MANITOBA LAW 
REV. 237, at 246. 
l27Ibid., at 247. 
128 6 CONGo DIGEST 131 (1981) 
129 Larsen, pp. 245-246. 
There must simply be meaningful repre-
sentation - representation which will 
bring to the councils of charity voices 
angry with the failures of charity and 
which will produce a fruitful dialogue 
between groups that may have never talked 
to one another before • . • 
This principle of participation is not 130 
a conversation piece; it has been applied. 
49 
This concern for "public participation" was expressed 
against a backdrop of protest marches, campus unrest and 
racial violence. For the present social order, the only 
means to reestablish social control was to allow the poor 
and dissatisfied members of the population to affect social 
change. This necessarily led to the establishment of the 
L. S. O. 
The difficulty in this area, is attempting to assess 
the total impact of L. s. O. It is a practical impossibility 
to create a scientifically-viable study to measure the 
L. S. O.'s impact in real terms on social unrest. What-
ever the statistical value may be, it is apparent that 
social control is accepted as a direct result of such 
government activities. Therefore, social control is an 
implied, and very valuable result of such undertakings. 
One thing is certain, whatever was accomplished in 
the 1960's and 1970's by the L. S. 0., is non-existent 
today. In 1980, the budget-conscious Reagan Administration 
proposed that the L. S. o. not be reauthorized for 1981. 
l30Ibid . 
-Since that time the program has limped along on partial 
f d · f . . C . 1 1 t' 131 un ~ng rom a cont~nu1ng ongress~ona reso u ~on. 
131Executive Office of the President, Major Themes and 
Additional Budget Details (FY 1983), pp. 33-34. 
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IV. WHO SHALL PAY? 
If there is a bottom line, or a final weighted factor 
in determining whether appointed counsel is to be require~ 
it is the additional cost of that counsel. This fiscal 
issue has underlined virtually every right to counsel case 
considered in this analysis. As early as 1941, in 
Betts v. Brady, where the Supreme Court denied the right 
to appointed counsel in non-felony cases, the decision 
rested, in some degree, on economic rationale. The Court, 
expressing a fear of fiscal impact, stated: 
Charges of small crimes tried before 
justices of the peace and capital 
charges tried in higher courts would 
equally require appointment of counsel. 
Presumably it would be argued that 
tria~s i~ t~32Traffic Court would 
requl.re l.t. 
The ultimate concern of the Court was that counsel would, 
by the Illogic of the Fourteenth Amendment,1I be required 
lIin civil cases involving property. 11 1 33 
Nowhere was the economic rationale of the Court more 
apparent than in Justice Clark's dissent in Douglas v. 
California. In this case, the majority held that a 
California rule allowing the discretionary appointment of 
counsel for indigents on IIlegitimate ll appeals only was 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Clark, blasting 
l32Betts d v. Bra y, supra., at 473. 
l33Ibid • 
--
the majority's ruling, remarked: 
I cannot understand why the Court says 
that this procedure afforded to the 
petitioners is 'a meaningless ritual.' 
To appoint an attorney would not only 
have been utter extravagance and a 
waste of the state's funds but as surely 
'meaningless' to the petitioners. 
With this new fetish for indigency the 
Court piles an intolerable burd~~4upon 
the state's judicial machinery. 
In recent years, with the fiscal conservationism of 
52 
the justices increasing, the monetary concerns of the Court 
have increased. The dissenters have now adopted the cry of 
the majority since the Warren era. 
Nothing is more exemplary of this fundamental economic 
conservationism than the Court's 1981 holding in Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services. The majority denied the 
right to appointed counsel in parental right terminations 
on fiscal rationale. In a stinging dissent, Stevens 
branded the Court for its preoccupation with "material 
resources. "135 Stevens then concluded: 
134 
The issue is one of fundamental fairness, 
not of weighing the pecuniary costs against 
societal benefits .•. For the value of 
protecting our liberty from deprivation 
~y th7 State !~6hout due process of law 
lS pr1ce1ess. 
Likewise, state courts are susceptible to the same 
Douglas v. California, supra., at 359. 
135L . f· 1 ass1ter v. Dept. 2- SOC1a Services, supra., at 59. 
136Ibid ., at 60. 
type of economic pressures. As described in Section II, 
New York appeals courts have refused to establish broad 
53 
right to counsel decisions in dissolutions. The reason was 
simple: allocations of public funds for such matters 
should be made in the legislature rather than in the courts. 137 
One conclusion is apparent. Whatever the form of 
reasoning, or judicial balancing, central to the question 
of whether appointed counsel is required, is one question: 
who shall pay? 
137 S '1 Re m~ ey, supra. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
The economic rationalizations occurring under the due 
process and equal protection doctrines are more expansive 
than indicated in the previous section. The entire subjective 
system leans toward economic considerations. 
The criteria employed by the judiciary is dependent 
upon an economic cost-effective rationalization. The 
newly-considered procedutes are evaluated in terms of the 
additional cost and burden to the state. The interest, 
whether liberty or property, is then rationalized according 
to the additional cost. The problem begins at this point. 
The values associated with liberty and property cannot be 
reduced to a universally accepted value. In effect, the 
courts are weighing unlike factors. 
with the magnitude of interests on all sides, the central 
question becomes rather basic: Should the level of protect-
ion afforded to constitutionally-enumerated interests be 
subjected to the ecomomic rationalizations of individual 
judges? It is doubtful that any democratic system would 
allow the basic procedural rights of its citizens to be 
subjected to continual re-evaluations by individual judges. 
In order to secure the full protection of constitu-
tionally defined interests for the individual, and the 
collateral benefits to society, a procedural rule requiring 
the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants should 
be established in all civil areas. 
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